Liquidity risk is associated with solvency concerns at the re…nancing stage. To insure, banks can accumulate liquidity (have a bu¤er of short-term assets) or adopt transparency (facilitate solvency information transmission). Both are important: a liquidity bu¤er provides complete insurance against small liquidity shocks, transparency -partial against large ones as well. Banks'private risk management choices can be distorted by leverage. We show that banks can under-invest in both liquidity and transparency due to risk-shifting, and bias towards liquidity as it preserves internal control. While optimal liquidity can be imposed, transparency is not veri…able. The resulting multi-tasking problem complicates the optimal design of liquidity regulation. In particular, reserve requirements can compromise banks'endogenous transparency choices. Consequently, social welfare and …nancial stability may deteriorate, particularly in …nancially developed economies where market access plays a larger role. Also, liquidity regulation may in fact address the milder distortion, with initiatives to improve transparency being more important.
Introduction
In performing maturity transformation, banks insure public's liquidity needs, but become exposed to liquidity risk. The concern is that if re…nancing frictions prevent a solvent bank from covering a liquidity shortage, it may go bankrupt despite having valuable long-term assets.
Most recent bank liquidity events in developed countries were associated with in- While, as uncertainty resolves, rumors may turn out to be unsubstantiated, cash withdrawals and restricted access to new funding impose signi…cant strain on a bank's ability to ful…ll its liabilities during the crisis. To survive, a bank must be able to support itself with own funds for the duration of liquidity stress, and/or alleviate the markets' concerns over its solvency as soon as possible.
The purpose of this paper is to study the options for bank's liquidity risk management, when liquidity risk is associated with solvency concerns at the re…nancing stage.
We suggest that there are two distinct ways in which a solvent bank can insure against a failure in a liquidity shock. One is to accumulate liquidity -form a precautionary bu¤er of short-term assets to cover possible out ‡ows internally. Another is to adopt transparency -establish a set of mechanisms that facilitate information transmission to the market and help resolve solvency uncertainty. We explore socially optimal and private liquidity risk management choices, study the interaction between liquidity and transparency, and formulate policy and empirical implications.
The intuition of our modelling and main results is as follows. A bank has a long-term positive NPV project that typically yields a high return, but with a small probability can turn out to be of zero value (a solvency problem). At the intermediate date, a bank has to re…nance an exogenous random withdrawal. In most states of the world, a bank is known to be highly solvent, and investors are willing to extend new …nancing in place of withdrawals. However with some probability, the bank can experience a "liquidity shock", when the conditional probability of insolvency becomes high. Increased solvency concerns make investors unwilling to re…nance the bank, unless solvency uncertainty is positively resolved.
There are two ways in which a solvent bank can assure continuation in such an event.
One is to accumulate liquidity, by allocating some funds to a precautionary bu¤er of short-term assets. That would allow to cover possible out ‡ows internally. Another is to adopt transparency, that is to establish mechanisms that facilitate solvency information transmission to the public and help resolve solvency uncertainty. If successful, that would allow to re…nance by borrowing from the market. Both investments -in liquidity and in transparency -are strategic ex-ante decisions, which should be taken at the initial date, before possible liquidity risks realize.
Liquidity and transparency are costly hedges, with costs stemming from a number of sources. Firstly, a bank operates under a capital constraint, which restricts maximum initial borrowing. Therefore, when a bank invests in a liquidity bu¤er or spends on establishing transparency, that crowds out pro…table long-term investment. Secondly, there are direct costs. For liquidity, we consider those stemming from increased banker's moral hazard (Myers and Rajan, 1998) , in particular in liquid but insolvent bankers. For transparency, we associate the costs with the expenses of establishing credible disclosure mechanisms.
Liquidity and transparency have di¤erent e¤ects in risk management. A precautionary bu¤er allows to cover internally all liquidity shortages within its size, providing complete insurance against smaller shocks. However large bu¤ers are prohibitively costly, so liquidity cannot be used cover large shocks. Transparency helps resolve solvency uncertainty and enables re…nancing by borrowing from the market. That can cover any liquidity shocks -small or large. Yet, since it relies on ex-post information communication, transparency is e¤ective only with some probability. It therefore provides incomplete insurance, but also against large shocks. We show that banks may therefore optimally combine liquidity and transparency in their liquidity risk management. They can use liquidity to fully insure against small shocks, and transparency -to partially cover large shocks as well.
The main distortion in our model comes from leverage. We show that due to riskshifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , bankers may under-invest in liquidity, or transparency, or both. This creates scope for policy intervention with the aim of reinstating optimal liquidity risk management. However, while liquidity is veri…able and can be imposed, for example, by reserve requirements, regulatory lever on transparency choices is small. This makes liquidity regulation a multi-tasking problem, and complicates optimal policy design. We show that liquidity requirements can compromise banks'endogenous trans-parency choices. This is especially likely when transparency is by itself an e¤ective risk management mechanism and market access in important in mitigating liquidity shocks.
There is therefore a danger that …nancial stability and social welfare may deteriorate as a result of ill-designed liquidity requirements.
Another issue is that, when liquidity is associated with signi…cant private bene…ts (as in Myers and Rajan, 1998) , banks may already have a bias towards liquidity, at the expense of transparency. Liquidity allows them to retain internal control in the stress event and consume private bene…ts if insolvent. This deepens concerns over reserve requirements, since they may in addition target the "wrong" and milder distortion. Policy initiatives to improve transparency may be equally or more important than regulation oriented on stock liquidity.
The principal links of this paper to the existing literature are as follows. This paper contributes to the literature on liquidity crises. Our modelling of liquidity events di¤ers from the mainstream approach of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in several aspects.
Firstly, in our model, liquidity needs originate on the liabilities side of the balance sheet and are clearly related to re…nancing needs. Secondly, the re…nancing problem is driven by asymmetric information, not moral hazard or aggregate liquidity shortages. Such speci…cation relates to the " ‡ight to quality" phenomenon (Bernanke et al., 1996) , and has strong empirical foundations. There is also an understanding that transparency enables market access and facilitates the management of liquidity shocks. Kashyap and Stein (1990) show that larger banks, and Holod and Peek (2004) -that publicly held banks (both can be seen as proxies for better market access) are less reactive to monetary policy tightening.
There is also strong evidence on the relative shortage of transparency in the banking system. Morgan (1998) …nds that bank bonds are more opaque than industrial (basing on the degree of ratings agencies disagreement), and Flannery et al. (2004) suggest that bank stocks are at least as opaque as industrial (basing on trading microstructure properties), while banks' higher re…nancing needs require that they actually be less opaque.
Our contribution is to emphasize the more complex nature of the interaction between liquidity and transparency. We suggest that liquidity and transparency can have complementary as well as substitute e¤ects. In particular, liquidity is more e¤ective in covering small (or routine) shocks, while transparency enable to deal with large (or exceptional) events.
The literature has yet devoted little attention to the relationship between cash in hand and borrowing capacity. In a recent paper, Acharya et al. (2006) relate the trade-o¤ between increasing cash and withdrawing debt to long-term hedging choices.
We o¤er a di¤erent perspective, basing on that the e¤ects of liquidity are certain yet limited, while those of transparency -uncertain but potentially able to address large shocks.
Interactions identi…ed in this model provide avenues for possible empirical research.
We predict that more liquid banks will be more resilient to small shocks, while more 
Setup

Economy and Agents
Consider a risk-neutral economy with three dates: 0; 1; 2. The economy is populated by multiple small investors (depositors) and a single bank. Small investors are endowed with money. They have access to a safe storage technology (cash), or can lend to the bank, charging the gross interest rate of 1.
The bank is penniless, but has access to a pro…table investment project. For each unit of …nancing at date 0, the project returns at date 2: typically a high return X with probability 1 s, but 0 with a small probability s (s for a solvency problem).
A bank operates under a leverage constraint (representing capital requirements) and cannot borrow more than 1 at date 0.
All …nancing takes the form of simple debt. Banks maximize date 2 pro…t.
Solvency Uncertainty and Liquidity Risk
While the project is long-term, some debt matures earlier and must be re…nanced.
This represents either the withdrawals of demandable deposits, or the maturity of term funding. While in reality there may be multiple re…nancing events through the course of the project, for the analysis we collapse them into a single "intermediate" date 1.
The amount of funds maturing at date 1 is random. With probability 1=2, the liquidity need is low -the bank has to repay some L < 1. With additional probability 1=2, the liquidity need is high -the bank has to repay a full 1. If the bank cannot repay, it fails and goes bankrupt with 0 liquidation value.
Because small investors always o¤er an elastic supply of funds, a bank known to be solvent is able to re…nance itself by new borrowing and thus substitute any withdrawals at date 1. However this may be prevented by possible e¤ects of asymmetric information at date 1, namely the increased concerns about a bank's solvency. This is the origin of liquidity risk in this model.
Remember that a bank is solvent with probability 1 s and insolvent with probability s. Assume that the bankers receive complete information on the bank's solvency before date 1. However the public's information may be noisy. Only with probability 1 (s+q) the public receives a correct signal that a bank is solvent and will yield X with certainty. Such banks will be able to obtain re…nancing, and such re…nancing would be risk-free.
With additional probability, s + q, there is a signal that a bank is not in the above category and may be insolvent. This represents a probability q (q for liquidity problem) that a solvent bank is pooled with insolvent banks. The posterior probability of insolvency in such a case, s=(s + q), is higher then the ex-ante probability of insolvency, s.
This represents increased solvency concerns -a higher uncertainty over the …nal pay-o¤, which may prevent external re…nancing. We therefore call such event a "liquidity shock".
We impose the following restrictions on parameter values: 1. A bank has a positive NPV, even if it always failed in a liquidity shock.
X > 1 1 (s + q)
This assures that a bank is always …nanced at date 0.
2.
A bank in a liquidity shock has a negative posterior expected NPV at date 1.
X < s + q q
We make two additional assumptions for expositional simplicity -they allow to focus on most relevant e¤ects and cases. 
Liquidity Risk Management
We consider two distinct ways in which a bank can hedge its liquidity risk.
1. Stock liquidity. After attracting the maximum 1 unit of initial …nancing, a bank can invest L of it not in the investment project, but in the short-term asset (cash).
This would allow a bank to fully cover small withdrawals at date 1, and therefore insure it against small liquidity shocks that happen with probability 1=2.
2. Adopt transparency. After attracting initial …nancing, a bank can invest T to establish transparency. We think of transparency as a strategic ex-ante investment, such as credible disclosure, that allows a bank to better communicate solvency information to the market. In particular, this may enable the bank to publicly con…rm its solvency in the event of liquidity shock. Since it relies on ex-post information transmission, transparency is an imperfect insurance against liquidity risk. We assume that, in the case of a shock, a transparent bank is able to prove its solvency (and thus obtain re…nancing) with a given probability t. The e¤ectiveness of transparency may be determined by factors outside a single bank's control, such as the level of …nancial market development in a country. Notice that transparency allows to insure against both small and large liquidity shocks.
Both liquidity and transparency have costs. We consider two sources of liquidity costs. Firstly, given maximum date 0 leverage, investing in liquidity crowds out investment in a pro…table project. This reduces the return to a successful liquid bank from X to X(1 L) + L, a loss of (X 1)L.
Secondly, we assume that when a liquid bank fails (e.g., due to inability to re…nance a large liquidity shock or insolvency), the value of its liquidity bu¤er is lost. It may, for example, be spent in costly bankruptcy proceedings, or appropriated by the bankers and transformed into marginal private bene…ts (as in Myers and Rajan; we here treat private bene…ts as insigni…cant, and examine their e¤ects in more detail in the extension in Section 6). This makes the return to a failing liquid bank 0.
The cost of transparency is the value of associated investment, T , which is, …rstly, a direct expense and, secondly, crowds out investment in a pro…table project. Transparency reduces return to a successful bank from X to X(1 T ), a loss of T .
We focus this analysis on di¤erent e¤ects rather than costs of liquidity and transparency (impact of costs would be mirroring), and therefore normalize the costs to be equal:
where C is now a generic cost of hedging, either with liquidity or with transparency.
Notice that should a bank choose to invest in both liquidity and transparency, a return in the successful state would be X(1 L T ) + L = X 2C. The costs simply double.
Liquidity and transparency are therefore costly hedges against liquidity risk. The decisions on whether and how to hedge are made by the bankers, and, we assume here, are not contractible. In the presence of leverage, this gives rise to a risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ) that may lead to insu¢ cient hedging. This basic con ‡ict of interest is the principal distortion of our model. The game tree is shown on Figure 1 .
<<Figure 1 goes here>>
First Best: Liquidity and Transparency
We …rst consider socially optimal levels of bank's liquidity and transparency, and show that, when costs of hedging are not too high, it is optimal that the bank combines liquidity and transparency in its risk management. Then, liquidity completely insures a solvent bank against a failure in a small liquidity shock, which the bank will be able to cover from the precautionary bu¤er. Transparency partially insures a bank against a failure in a large liquidity shock, by possibly enabling market borrowing to re…nance .
Risk Management Options
We …rst derive the social payo¤s depending on the bank's liquidity management choices.
They are: For a strategy "N" when a bank is not liquid and not transparent:
Here, 1 s q is the probability that a bank is not hit by a solvency or liquidity shock, X is the return in that case, and 1 is the initial investment.
For a strategy "L" when a bank is liquid but not transparent:
A solvent bank is able to survive a small liquidity shock by covering it from the precautionary bu¤er (probability q=2), but fails in a large liquidity shock that is above the bu¤er size. The probability of a solvency shock is s; and of a large liquidity shock q=2.
Therefore the probability of survival is 1 s q=2; the return in that case is X C (note C is the hedging cost), and the initial investment is 1.
For a strategy "T" when a bank is transparent but not liquid:
successful in communicating solvency information to the market, that is with probability t. The probability of a solvency shock is s, and that of a solvent bank being unable to prove its solvency to the market q(1 t). Therefore the probability of survival is 1 s q(1 t); the return in that case is X C, and the initial investment is 1.
Lastly, for a strategy "LT", when a bank is both liquid and transparent:
A solvent bank is able to survive a small liquidity shock always by covering it from a precautionary bu¤er, and a large liquidity shock with probability t when it is successful in communicating solvency information. The probability of a solvency sock is s, and of a large liquidity shock when a bank is unable to prove its solvency to the market q=2 (1 t). Therefore the probability of survival is 1 s q(1 t)=2, the return in that case is X 2C (note double the hedging cost), and the initial investment 1.
Optimal Risk Management
We use these four payo¤s to compare social welfare and derive bank's optimal risk management choices.
We …rst analyze the choice between liquidity and transparency. Liquidity insures against half of the shocks -small shocks only. Transparency insures against share t of the shocks -only when ex-post information communication is successful. Thus when t is low -liquidity is more e¤ective, and when t is high -transparency is more e¤ective. Indeed, observe that S L > S T (liquidity is optimal) for t < 1=2, and S T > S L (transparency is optimal) for t > 1=2.
Another dimension is the depth of hedging -whether to hedge at all, adopt a single hedge (liquidity or transparency -whichever is more e¤ective), or have both hedges.
Note that the marginal bene…t of the second hedge is lower than the marginal bene…t of the …rst hedge. This is because, …rstly, the …rst hedge is already a more e¤ective one (liquidity for t < 1=2 and transparency for t > 1=2), and, secondly, the …rst hedge already protects a bank from a range of liquidity shocks. We analyze the optimal depth of hedging as a function of the cost of hedging C. We derive results separately for two cases, corresponding to more e¤ective liquidity or transparency. -Is both liquid and transparent, "LT", for S LT > S T , corresponding to:
Now observe that for any t, and any q and s, there exists C low enough, such that having both hedges is a socially optimal decision of a bank:
From here we can formulate the …rst main result.
Proposition 1 Banks can combine liquidity and transparency in their risk management. There exist parameter values, such that it is optimal that a bank is both liquid and transparent, combining the two hedging mechanisms in its liquidity risk management.
This demonstrates that both holding of short-term assets on the balance sheet, and being able to borrow from the market, are important and potentially complementary dimensions of liquidity risk management. They may, and under certain conditions should, be combined, to achieve a socially optimal outcome.
Private Choices: Leverage and Suboptimal Liquidity
Risk Management
We now turn to bank's private liquidity and transparency choices. They may deviate from the socially optimal ones, because a bank is leveraged. The presence of debt gives bankers risk-shifting incentives, revealing as lower private incentives to hedge. The reason is that the bankers incur the costs of hedging in the form of reduced payo¤ in the good state, but do not carry the burden of failure in the bad state thanks to limited liability. Those losses are born by debtholders (depositors, or the deposit insurance fund).
We base this analysis on the assumption that liquidity and transparency choices are not contractible (for example, because depositors are small). We return to the question of in ‡uencing bank's choices in the policy intervention discussion in the following section.
We assume that the condition (1) holds, so that it is socially optimal that banks are both liquid and transparent. We study how leverage can distort hedging incentives and bias bank's liquidity risk management choices away from the socially optimal ones.
Private Payo¤s
Before deriving private payo¤s, consider the bank's leverage. Observe that, at date 0, the bank is …nanced at 1 nominal interest rate thanks to deposit insurance, so that the original debt is 1. Part of that funding matures at date 1. When the bank covers out ‡ows from the precautionary bu¤er, this reduces debt remaining to date 2 by the same amount. When the bank …nances out ‡ows by market borrowing, new funding is also attracted at 1 nominal interest rate because it is only provided when there is no uncertainty over a bank's solvency. Therefore, the total net debt payments the bank has to make in case of success are always 1.
We can now proceed to private payo¤s. While they are similar to the social payo¤s, the di¤erence is that the bankers repay initial investment only if the project succeeds.
When the project fails, losses accrue to depositors (and are covered from the deposit insurance fund). The private payo¤s are: For a strategy "N" when a bank is not liquid and not transparent:
Risk Management Choices
Since liquidity and transparency have the same costs, and the bankers have some stake in the e¤ectiveness of the hedge they adopt, the private choice between liquidity and transparency is not in ‡uenced by leverage. Liquidity is preferred, L > T , for t < 1=2;
and transparency is preferred, T > L , for t > 1=2.
However, leverage in ‡uences the depth of hedging. Since the incentives to hedge are lower, the same depth is chosen only for lower costs of hedging. We distinguish the same two cases, corresponding to more e¤ective liquidity or transparency:
Case 1: Liquidity more e¤ective, t < 1=2. The bank:
-Chooses not to hedge, "N", for N > L , corresponding to high costs of hedging:
-Chooses to only liquid, "L", for L > N and L > LT , corresponding to intermediate costs of hedging:
to low costs of hedging:
Note the di¤erence in these marginal points compared to those in social payo¤s.
The cost of hedging is now compared not with the social return X but with the private return X 1, and this biases all threshold points towards lower values of C.
Case 2: Transparency more e¤ective, t > 1=2. The bank:
-Chooses not to hedge, "N", for N > T , corresponding to:
-Chooses to be only transparent, "T", for T > N and T > LT , corresponding to:
-Chooses to be both liquid and transparent, "LT", for LT > T , corresponding to:
We can now compare the private decisions with the social optimum. Under the condition that the combination of liquidity and transparency is socially optimal (1) and
the assumption that public and private incentives are not too divergent (X > 2), we can rule out the extreme cases when banks choose to be neither liquid nor transparent.
Lemma 1 When a combination of liquidity and transparency is socially optimal, and private and public incentives not too divergent, bank would choose to have at least some liquidity risk hedge (liquidity, or transparency, or both)
Proof. For t < 1=2 we have to show that
This follows from that, in the numerator, X 1 > tX since X > 2 and t < 1=2; and in the denominator, 1 s q=2 < 1 s q(1=2 t).
For t > 1=2 we have to show that
This follows from that, in the nominator, X 1 < (1 t)X since X > 2 and
(1 t) > 1=2; and in the denominator, 1 s q(1 t) < 1 s.
Lemma 1 restricts bank's strategies to the choice between a single hedge or a combination of two hedges. When the cost of hedging is very low, such that conditions (2) or (4) are satis…ed, the bankers will choose to be both liquid and transparent, in line with the social optimum. However, when the cost of hedging is not as low, and the bank may choose to have a single hedge, despite the fact that a combination of liquidity and transparency is socially optimal. In particular, for any t, and any q and s, there exists C such that:
For t < 1=2, a bank chooses to be only liquid while it is socially optimal that it is both liquid and transparent:
For t > 1=2, a bank chooses to be only transparent while it is socially optimal that it is both liquid and transparent:
The scope for divergence is determined in particular by X -returns in the good state (related to the charter value) that reduce e¤ective leverage. We can now formulate the following main result:
Proposition 2 A bank may under-invest in liquidity and transparency due to riskshifting incentives associated with leverage. There exist parameter values, such that a bank chooses only liquidity or only transparency, while a combination of liquidity and transparency is socially optimal.
Public Intervention: Reserve Requirements and Transparency
In the previous section we have established that banks' private liquidity risk management choices can be suboptimal due to leverage. Banks may under-invest in liquidity or transparency. This creates scope for regulatory intervention. It is relatively easy to in ‡uence bank's liquidity, because the holdings of short-term assets on the balance sheet are normally veri…able. The authorities concerned with insu¢ cient liquidity can implement reserve requirements, intended to align bank's liquidity choices with their socially optimal level.
The regulatory lever on transparency is weaker. Mandatory disclosure may be in-e¤ective in promoting transparency when it is di¢ cult to precisely de…ne relevant and quanti…able parameters. Disclosure without proper private incentives can also be perfunctory on "creative" -overall, not credible. A suggestion by Calomiris (1999) to mandate the issue of short-term subordinated debt so as to make banks …nancial position more depended on the market's assessment and thus improve market discipline is
intriguing, but has not yet been fully tested in practice.
This implementation issue may explain why in addressing liquidity risk, …nancial regulation typically puts emphasis prudential liquidity bu¤ers rather than on the enhanced ability to re…nance by borrowing from the market 1 . However, when transparency is an important component of risk management, the optimal design of liquidity regulation becomes a multi-tasking problem. The concern is how liquidity requirements may a¤ect bank's endogenous transparency choices. To address this, we consider a case when a bank chooses suboptimal liquidity and study the consequences of introducing reserve requirements.
E¤ect of Reserve Requirements
Consider a setting where it is socially optimal that banks are both liquid and transparent, however, following their private incentives, banks under-invest in liquidity. Note that, by Lemma 1, banks must still have some liquidity risk hedge, and therefore are transparent.
The fact that banks choose transparency over liquidity implies that transparency is more e¤ective: t > 1=2. From (1) and (3), the range of relevant costs of hedging, such that S LT > S T but LT < T is:
Suppose that the authorities respond to suboptimal liquidity by imposing reserve requirements. They aim to restore socially optimal liquidity risk management, that combines liquidity and transparency. We can now show that this result will not always be achieved. In particular, there is a danger that, in response to liquidity requirements, banks may stop investing in transparency.
The decision regarding transparency depends on the e¤ectiveness of the second hedge. The intuition is that when t is high, and transparency very e¤ective, the bank is more likely to choose it as a second hedge on top of mandated liquidity. From (2) and (3), the range of costs of hedging C such that banks chose to be transparent only, LT < T , and are willing to retain transparency after the introduction of liquidity requirements, LT > L , is:
Note that this is not empty, because q(1 t)=2 < qt=2 and 1 s > 1 s q(1=2 t).
However, when t is close to 1=2, transparency is relatively less e¤ective, and the bank may choose to remain with mandated liquidity only. This would happen when LT < L even though S LT > S L . From (1) and (2), for any q and s there exist values of t larger but close enough to 1=2, and values of C such that:
Note that, indeed, for t close to, but still above, 1=2, the two fractions in (5) become nearly identical, while X 1 < X. Then the region de…ned by (5) , in response to reserve requirements, a bank would stop investing in transparency and remain with mandated liquidity only.
Proposition 3 Liquidity requirements may compromise bank's endogenous transparency choices.
Such a shift from transparency to liquidity would be detrimental for welfare. Remember that the reason for why a bank chose to forego liquidity in the …rst place (and remained only with transparency) was that liquidity was relatively less e¢ cient as a method of hedging against liquidity risk. Since t > 1=2, the probability of liquidity crises increases from q(1 t) to q=2, by q(t 1=2). This represents lower …nancial stability and higher welfare losses from the bankruptcies of solvent banks.
Note lastly that transparency is likely to be e¤ective, t > 1=2, in countries with relatively more developed …nancial markets, where banks can better rely on external re-…nancing in the case of a liquidity shock. It is in those countries that improperly designed liquidity requirements may have an unwanted adverse e¤ect. Transparency is likely to be less e¤ective, t < 1=2, in countries with developing …nancial systems. (There, reliance on liquidity, predicted by our model, well corresponds to the evidence of typically highly liquid banks, and higher and more binding reserve requirements.) This suggests that, internationally, there may be heterogeneity in optimal liquidity-transparency outcomes, and divergent bene…ts and costs of liquidity regulation. Financial markets development may be a signi…cant determinant in ‡uencing the relative importance of prudential bu¤ers versus market access in managing liquidity risks. This may need to be borne in mind in the possible process of international convergence of liquidity regulation.
Liquidity Bias
In this section we extend the basic model to study the private bene…ts of liquidity.
Myers and Rajan (1998) showed that, while o¤ering protection against liquidity shocks, the holdings of short-term assets may also enable managers (bankers) to extract private bene…ts from controlling them. The reason is that it is relatively easy to direct liquid funds in privately bene…cial ways, and relatively di¢ cult to do that with encumbered long-term assets. Liquid funds can be can be invested pet projects, spent on perks, or just tunneled away.
So far in the model, leverage has only a¤ected the privately chosen depth of hedging, but did not distort socially optimal choice between liquidity and transparency. Here we show that, under private bene…ts of liquidity that choice can also become distorted.
Banks may choose liquidity where transparency would have been preferred from a social welfare standpoint.
It seems natural to associate the misuse of liquidity with the situation on non-viable banks, for example where a bank is liquid but insolvent, or has su¤ered a liquidity shock beyond the size of its precautionary bu¤er and cannot cover it externally by borrowing.
In these cases, a bank fails, and the value of banker's equity is 0. We assume that, in response, they are able to transform the remaining liquidity (by tunneling or otherwise) into private bene…ts .
Payo¤s with private bene…ts
The presence of private bene…ts alters the social and private payo¤s. Respective payo¤s for a strategy "L" are: = (1 s q=2) (X C 1) + (s + q=2)
Payo¤s for a strategy "LT" are:
The last terms accounts for private bene…ts that bankers receive when a liquid bank fails.
Observe that private bene…ts introduce divergence in the social and private choices between liquidity and transparency. Transparency is welfare preferred over liquidity, S T > S L; , for t > 1=2 + (s + q=2) q(X C)
Yet, bankers privately choose transparency over liquidity, T > L; , only for:
t > 1=2 + (s + q=2) q(X C 1)
Observe that 1=2 + (s + q=2) q(X C) < 1=2 + (s + q=2) q(X C 1) so that bankers privately choose transparency only for a narrower range of higher values of t, and in particular may choose liquidity while it is socially optimal to be transparent for:
1=2 + (s + q=2)=q(X C) < t < 1=2 + (s + q=2)=q(X C 1) (8)
Double distortion
Consider now a situation where, for social welfare, transparency is preferred to liquidity, S T > S L; (6) , and both hedges are preferred to transparency only, S LT; > S T :
Consider in addition that, privately, liquidity is preferred to transparency (7) , and transparency only (and therefore liquidity only) is preferred to both hedges, LT; > T : C > q(1 t)=2 1 s (X 1) + s + q(1 t)=2 1 s
Then, for parameter values given by (8) and
q(1 t)=2 1 s (X 1) + s + q(1 t)=2 1 s < C < q(1 t)=2 1 s X + s + q(1 t)=2 1 s banks operate under two distortions to socially optimal liquidity risk management.
They, …rstly, choose a single hedge instead of both hedges, due to leverage. Secondly, for this single hedge, they choose liquidity instead of transparency, due to the associated private bene…ts of control. We can now formulate the last result.
Proposition 4 When liquidity is associated with private bene…ts of control, in addition to suboptimal depth of liquidity risk hedging, banks may choose a suboptimal type of hedging -use prudential liquidity bu¤ ers instead of investing in transparency.
The fact that banks may have an intrinsic bias towards liquidity, at the expense of transparency, further cautions on over-reliance on liquidity requirements. There may be a need for more attention to transparency in policy actions aimed at alleviating excessive liquidity risk taking.
Conclusion
This paper studied the roles of liquidity and transparency in bank's liquidity risk management. We showed that investing in both is important, yet bank's private choices may be distorted by leverage. Policy response is complicated by the fact that transparency is not veri…able, making the design of optimal reserve requirements a multi-tasking problem. In particular, there is a danger that reserve requirements compromise bank's endogenous transparency incentives. Initiatives to improve transparency may have prime importance in the regulatory e¤orts to control and mitigate liquidity risks. 
